An Exploration of Reputation Formation in Experimental Games

Jordi Brandts and N. Figueras

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: This paper presents results from experiments with finitely repeated games with complete and incomplete information. We use two treatment variables: the number of rounds the game is played and the value of the probability that reflects the presence of incomplete information.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: An exploration of reputation formation in experimental games (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:404.97

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