Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care

Xavier Martinez-Giralt and Pedro Barros

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set constituted by the more efficient providers, and then apply the same price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining position of providers. The more efficient providers are also the ones with higher profits in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them to ext act a higher surplus from the third-party payer.

Keywords: Professional Associations; Health Care; Negotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2000-11-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care (2015)
Journal Article: Negotiation Advantages of Professional Associations in Health Care (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:466.00

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