Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

Carmen Bevia (), Luis C. Corch?n and Simon Wilkie
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Luis C. Corchon

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Keywords: Market Games; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D40 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2001/49301.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WALRASIAN CORRESPONDENCE BY MARKET GAMES (1995)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:493.01

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