IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WALRASIAN CORRESPONDENCE BY MARKET GAMES

Luis Corchon and Simon Wilkie

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.

Keywords: Mechanism; Market Games; Nash Equilibrium; Strong Equilibrium; Implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1995-01
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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1995-02.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 1995 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1995-02

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