Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Keywords: Matching; Couples; Stability; Random Paths; Responsiveness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2004-02-08, Revised 2005-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples (2015)
Journal Article: Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:604.04

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