Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

No 156, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Keywords: stability; matching; couples; responsiveness; Random Paths (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://bw.bse.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/1156-file.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Paths to stability for matching markets with couples (2007)
Working Paper: Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:156

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Bruno Guallar ().