Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

Helmuts Azacis

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Keywords: Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2004-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint (2008)
Working Paper: Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:623.04

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