Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint
Helmuts Azacis ()
No E2005/10, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.
Keywords: Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
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Published in Games and Economic Behaviour , 62(1), pp. 140-154, January 2008.
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Journal Article: Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint (2008)
Working Paper: Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2005/10
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