Median Stable Matching for College Admission

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Keywords: Matching; College admissions problem; Stability; Fairness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2004-11-18, Revised 2006-02-16
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2004/63204.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Median Stable Matching for College Admission (2015)
Journal Article: Median Stable Matching for College Admissions (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:632.04

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