Median Stable Matching for College Admission

Bettina Klaus () and Flip Klijn

No 165, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

Keywords: fairness; stability; matching; College admissions problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Median Stable Matching for College Admissions (2006)
Working Paper: Median Stable Matching for College Admission (2006)
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