Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences

Jordi Masso and Antonio Nicolo'

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be efficient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous and group stable.

Keywords: Public Goods; Crowding Preferences; Subgame Perfect Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2004-11-01
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Working Paper: Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:638.04

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