Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences

Antonio Nicolò and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Nicolo' and Jordi Masso

No 148, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same alternative, they prefer the allocation with the largest number of users. We require that a decision be efficient and stable (which guarantees free participation in the group of users and free exit from it). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property. The social choice function implemented by the proposed mechanism is also anonymous and group stable.

Keywords: Public Goods; Crowding Preferences; Subgame Perfect Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences (2004)
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