On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

Ruth Martinez, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme () and Jorge Oviedo

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.

Keywords: Matching; Core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25
Date: 2009-07-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles (2015)
Journal Article: On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:803.09

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