On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

Alejandro Neme (), Ruth Martínez, Jorge Oviedo and Jordi Massó
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jordi Masso

No 390, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.

Keywords: matching; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles (2012)
Working Paper: On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:390

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