On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness

Jordi Masso and Ines Moreno de Barreda

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Single-peaked Preferences; Median Voter; Feasibility Constraints. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2010-03-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness (2015)
Journal Article: On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:809.10

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