On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

Jordi Masso and Inés Moreno de Barreda

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 72, issue 2, 467-484

Abstract: We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Single-peaked; preferences; Median; voter; Feasibility; constraints (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-Peakedness (2015)
Working Paper: On Strategy-proofness and Symmetric Single-peakedness (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:467-484

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