On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness

R. Pablo Arribillaga, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy- proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisies the increasing intersection property we deine an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.

Keywords: Obvious Strategy-proofness; Generalized Median Voters; Single-peakedness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2019-10-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Related works:
Journal Article: On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (2020)
Working Paper: On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:967.19

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