On Obvious Strategy-Proofness and Single-Peakedness
R. Pablo Arribillaga (),
Jordi Masso and
Alejandro Neme ()
No 1122, Working Papers from Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy- proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter scheme is obviously strategy-proof if and only if it satisfies the increasing intersection property. Our proof is constructive; for each generalized median voter scheme that satisfies the increasing intersection property we define an extensive game form that implements it in obviously dominant strategies.
Keywords: obvious strategy-proofness; generalized median voters; single-peakedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness (2020)
Working Paper: On Obvious Strategy-proofness and Single-peakedness (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:1122
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