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Implementing (un)fair procedures? Favoritism and process fairness when inequality is inevitable

Robert J. Schmidt and Stefan T. Trautmann

No 661, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.

Keywords: equality; procedural justice; discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-04-25
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