Solving Dilemma Games with Evolving Conditional Commitments

Jörg Oechssler

No 770, Working Papers from University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Abstract: I study a formal mechanism that can sustain Pareto optimality in a new and very broad class of dilemma games. In the absence of a central authority that could enforce multilateral agreements, the mechanism is based on binding unilateral commitments, which condition a player's (possibly multidimensional) contribution on other players' contributions. I show that unexploitable better response dynamics converge to Pareto optimal contributions when the game is played recurrently.

Keywords: public goods; climate treaties; conditional contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-02-02
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