No Pain, No Gain: Market Reform, Unemployment, and Politics in Bulgaria
Neven Valev
International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University
Abstract:
In 1997, a new center-right government came to power in Bulgaria with a mandate to accelerate market reforms. By the time of the next elections in 2001, 75 percent of GDP was produced in the private sector, compared to 45 percent in 1996. The government however lost the elections. This paper uses unique survey data to examine whether the high unemployment associated with market reform contributed to the election outcome. The results suggest that high unemployment does not explain the election loss. In fact, many of the unemployed believed that high unemployment was the necessary price for future prosperity.
Keywords: Market Reform; Unemployment; Politics; Bulgaria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003-05-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
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http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0310.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: No pain, no gain: market reform, unemployment, and politics in Bulgaria (2004) 
Working Paper: No Pain, No Gain: Market Reform, Unemployment, and Politics in Bulgaria (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0310
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