On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs

Ehtisham Ahmad () and Leo Martinez

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: This paper argues that both horizontal and intertemporal competition among recipient governments are needed in order to ensure incentives for effective utilization of targeted transfers. This has implications for budgeting frameworks and the types of information needed, that might be amenable to formal contracting between the levels of government.

Keywords: Expenditure Programs; horizontal and intertemporal competition; budgeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2004-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0418.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0418

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