Pocketing and Deceiving: The Behavior of Agency in a Donor - Delivery Agency - Recipient Organization

Baoyun Qiao, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (jorgemartinez@gsu.edu) and Yongsheng Xu
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Baoyun Qiao: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, https://icepp.gsu.edu/

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: This paper presents a simple model to analyze the corrupt behavior of the delivery agency in a donor-delivery agency-recipient organization. Corrupt behavior of the delivery agency can take two forms: (i) “pocketing” or where the delivery agency distributes only a portion of the relief fund to the recipient and keeps the remaining fund to itself, and (ii) “deceiving”, where the delivery agency provides false information to the donor regarding the need of the recipient. We show that both forms of behavior can emerge as equilibrium outcomes in this type of organization. We identify factors that influence such corrupt behaviors and draw some policy implications.

Keywords: funds transfers; corrupt behaviors; donor organization; recipient organization; deliver organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 2006-02-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0613

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