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Tax Compliance, Tax Morale, and Governance Quality

Benno Torgler (), Markus Schaffner and Alison Macintyre
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Benno Torgler: The School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Taxpayers are more compliant than the traditional economic models predict. Why? The literature calls it the “puzzle of tax compliance”. In this paper we use field, experimental and survey data to investigate the empirical evidence on whether presence of tax morale helps to resolve this puzzle. The results reveal a strong correlation between tax morale and tax evasion/compliance which confirms the value of taking the research a step further by looking at the determinants of tax morale. We explore this question with a particular focus on the importance of governance quality.

Keywords: tax morale; tax compliance; tax evasion; institutional and governance quality; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2007-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (122)

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http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0727.pdf (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0727

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