Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just Another Economic Reform

Jorge Martinez-Vazquez () and Andrey Timofeev

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: In this paper we take stock of what the current system of sub-national governments is like in Egypt and then build on this assessment to suggest the form of decentralization that may be both effective and politically feasible. Practically every aspect of intergovernmental relations in Egypt seems to suffer from the lack of clarity and general vagueness. The all pervasive ambiguity is likely to be the outcome of an explicit policy design and has several main manifestations. A successful decentralization reform will require the political empowerment of local communities and this is a step that some in the current regime are unsure can be taken. At the same time there are others that feel that this is a step that the regime cannot afford not to take. Overall, there are reasons to be moderately optimistic about the prospects for fiscal decentralization reform, even if the obstacles remain formidable.

Keywords: Decentralizing; Egypt; Fiscal Decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2008-12-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2015/03/ispwp0833.pdf (application/pdf)

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Chapter: Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just Another Economic Reform (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0833

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