The Provision of Local Public Goods in Proportional Representation Electoral Systems with Closed and Open Party Lists

Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez (), Charles Hankla (), Jorge Martinez-Vazquez () and Eunice Heredia-Ortiz
Additional contact information
Raul A. Ponce-Rodriguez: Department of Economics, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez, http://www.uacj.mx
Eunice Heredia-Ortiz: Development Alternatives Inc., DAI, https://www.dai.com/
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: In this paper we find that the institutional set up of proportional representation systems matters for the welfare properties related with the ideal structure of government providing local public goods. In particular, we study the role of party centralization vs party decentralization in the provision of local public goods. In this paper, we show that the provision of local public goods with inter-regional spillovers by a system of local governments (welfare) dominates the fiscally centralized provision in economies with a proportional representation electoral system and closed party lists. We call this outcome the strong decentralization theorem. For this type of economies, the conventional decentralization theorem (originally identified by Oates 1972) is also satisfied. For economies with a proportional representation and open party lists systems the strong decentralization theorem is satisfied only when party centralization (i.e., the ability of party leaders to nominate candidates in the party’s lists) plays a dominant role in determining the policy platforms of candidates. However, if there is party decentralization (parties lack the ability to influence policy through the nomination process in the party’s list) the strong decentralization theorem is not satisfied. Lastly, the conventional decentralization theorem is satisfied in economies with proportional representation electoral systems and open party lists in both type of party systems: centralized and decentralized.

Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://icepp.gsu.edu/files/2021/07/paper1714.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1714

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Benson ().