The Evolving Role of Subnational Borrowing in Financing Decentralized Government

Timothy Goodspeed ()

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: Should subnational borrowing have a role in financing fiscal decentralization? Subnational debt received relatively little attention in the classic discussion of federalism by Oates (1972) although he indicates some ways in which subnational borrowing is sensible. I discuss what role (if any) subnational borrowing can play in macroeconomic stabilization as well state and local borrowing for capital projects. I also summarize recent discussions that center on the problems associated with subnational borrowing and potential solutions. What institutions, rules of the game, or rules of behavior are needed for successful subnational borrowing? Are there alternatives to subnational borrowing that can work better? I end by discussing the changing capital needs of subnational governments.

Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2024-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2414

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