The Politics of Public Goods Provision Under Asymmetric Decentralization

Ignacio Lago and Andre Blais
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Ignacio Lago: Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Political and Social Sciences, Barcelona, Spain
Andre Blais: Universite de Montreal, Departement de science politique, Canada

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: This paper examines how asymmetric regional decentralization affects the politics of public goods provision. While global decentralization has increased since World War II, the political consequences of growing asymmetry in the distribution of authority across regions within states remain understudied. Using survey data from Belgium, Canada, Germany, and Spain, as well as panel data from 709 legislative elections in 73 democracies (1960-2018), the study explores how centralized, symmetric, and asymmetric territorial arrangements influence electoral accountability and party nationalization. We show that asymmetric decentralization decreases electoral accountability in national elections but increases it in regional elections. Moreover, it contributes to greater territorial heterogeneity in partisan support within countries.

Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2026-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper2602

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