Political Institutions Without Property-Rights Deterioration: Evidence from Coup Attempts, 1950-2024

Alberto Chong
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Alberto Chong: Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University and Department of Economics, Universidad del Pacifico, Peru

International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU from International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: A large literature treats political and economic institutions as jointly determined, implying that a shock that removes constraints on the executive should weaken both. I test this transmission hypothesis using data for 95 countries from 1950 to 2024. Using complementary causal quasi-experimental designs, I find that coups sharply deteriorate political, legal, and administrative institutions and increase corruption. Against these large responses, however, property rights change little. This is not evidence of inertness: the same property-rights index rises by 0.45 standard deviations following a democratic transition. Coups also move property rights within countries, increasing absolute deviations from pre-coup levels without a common direction. The evidence therefore points to asymmetric institutional adjustment: political constraints can collapse sharply while broad measured property-rights protection remains comparatively persistent.

Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2026-10
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