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Do public health interventions crowd out private health investments? Malaria control policies in Eritrea

Pedro Carneiro, Tewolde Ghebremeskel, Joseph Keating and Andrea Locatelli

No 12/12, CeMMAP working papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: It is often argued that engaging in indoor residual spraying (IRS) in areas with high coverage of mosquito bed nets may discourage net ownership and use. This is just a case of a public program inducing perverse incentives. We analyze new data from a randomized control trial conducted in Eritrea which surprisingly shows the opposite: IRS encouraged net acquisition and use. Our evidence points to the role of imperfect information. The introduction of IRS may have made the problem of malaria more salient, leading to a change in beliefs about its importance and to an increase in private health investments.

Date: 2012-05-18
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https://www.cemmap.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CWP1212.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Do public health interventions crowd out private health investments? Malaria control policies in Eritrea (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Do Public Health Interventions Crowd Out Private Health Investments? Malaria Control Policies in Eritrea (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Do public health interventions crowd out private health investments? Malaria control policies in Eritrea (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Do Public Health Interventions Crowd Out Private Health Investments? Malaria Control Policies in Eritrea (2012) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:azt:cemmap:12/12

DOI: 10.1920/wp.cem.2012.1212

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