Econometric analysis of games with multiple equilibria

Aureo de Paula

No 29/12, CeMMAP working papers from Institute for Fiscal Studies

Abstract: This article reviews the recent literature on the econometric analysis of games where multiple solutions are possible. Multiplicity does not necessarily preclude the estimation of a particular model (and in certain cases even improves its identification), but ignoring it can lead to misspecifications. The survey starts with a general characterisation of structural models that highlights how multiplicity affects the classical paradigm. Because the information structure is an important guide to identification and estimation strategies, I discuss games of complete and incomplete information separately. Whereas many of the techniques discussed in the article can be transported across different information environments, some of them are specific to particular models. I also survey models of social interactions in a different section. I close with a brief discussion of post-estimation issues and research prospects.

Date: 2012-10-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria (2013)
Working Paper: Econometric analysis of games with multiple equilibria (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:azt:cemmap:29/12

DOI: 10.1920/wp.cem.2012.2912

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