Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points

Sylvester Eijffinger, Ronald Mahieu and Louis Raes

No 1628, BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers from BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy

Abstract: While not obvious at first sight, in many modern economies, the position of a monetary authority is similar to the position of the highest-level court (Goodhart (2002)). For example, both bodies are expected to operate independently even though there are crosscountry differences in what independence entails. In the United Kingdom, the highest court is the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (in short: Law Lords). There is a consensus among legal scholars that the powers of Law Lords with respect to the legislature are less wide ranging in the United Kingdom than the United States’ counterpart, the supreme court (Goodhart and Meade (2004), p.11). In economic jargon one says that the Supreme Court has goal independence whereas the Law Lords have instrument independence.

Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
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