POPULISM, FINANCIAL INEQUALITY AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE: A POLITICAL ECONOMICS APPROACH
Donato Masciandaro () and
Francesco Passarelli ()
No 1874, BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers from BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy
This paper examines myopic, populist policies that guarantee short-term financial protection of the people from the elite without regard for long-term fiscal or monetary distortions. Assuming that citizens arefinancially heterogeneous, this paper shows that inefficient outcomes can arise when the majority of citizens are bank stakeholders. Populist policies promote politically controlled central banks.
Keywords: Populism; central bank independence; monetary policy; banking policy; political economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 E31 E52 E58 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp1874
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