How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability

Dana Foarta

No 21156, BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers from BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy

Abstract: The organizational structure of the bureaucracy is a key determinant of policy outcomes. Bureaucratic agencies exhibit wide variation in their organizational capacity, which allows politicians to strategically shape policy implementation. This paper examines what bureaucratic structure implies for the ability of voters to hold politicians electorally accountable. It explicitly models di erences in organizational capacity across bureaucratic agencies and considers a problem where a politician must decide not only which policy to choose but which agency, or combination of agencies, will implement it. The choice of implementation feeds back into the choice of policy and this, in turn, a ects how voters perceive the performance of the incumbent. This creates a chain of interdependence from agency structure to policy choice and political accountability. The formal model shows that the variation in organizational capacity serves the interests of voters by improving electoral control of politicians.

Keywords: organizational capacity; electoral accountability; bureaucratic politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-pol
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Working Paper: How Organizational Capacity Can Improve Electoral Accountability (2022)
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