Corruption and Extremism

Attila Gáspár, Tommaso Giommoni, Massimo Morelli and Antonio Nicolò
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Nicolo'

No 21163, BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers from BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy

Abstract: This paper shows that corruption generates extremism, but almost exclusively on the opposition side. When the majority has greater ability to use corruption to obtain her favorite policy outcome from the minority, then the minority group has an incentive to select a more extreme representative because it is more unlikely that such a type will accept a bribe. On the majority side, on the other hand, the perception of more likely use of the corruption tool does not create any distortion in the choice of political representatives. We provide strong causal evidence for these novel predictions using two different types of corruption signals, in Indonesia and Brazil.

Keywords: Corruption; Extremism; Delegation; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-sea
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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption and Extremism (2020)
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