Assignment markets with the same core

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels
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Carles Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona

No 239, Working Papers in Economics from Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia

Abstract: In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a nite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sucient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.

JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 0 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Assignment markets with the same core (2011)
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