Assignment markets with the same core

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz, Marina Núñez () and Carles Rafels

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 73, issue 2, 553-563

Abstract: In the framework of bilateral assignment games, we study the set of matrices associated with assignment markets with the same core. We state conditions on matrix entries that ensure that the related assignment games have the same core. We prove that the set of matrices leading to the same core form a join-semilattice with a finite number of minimal elements and a unique maximum. We provide a characterization of the minimal elements. A sufficient condition under which the join-semilattice reduces to a lattice is also given.

Keywords: Assignment game; Core; Semilattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Assignment markets with the same core (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:2:p:553-563

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.011

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