Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement: Evidence from Switzerland

Barbara Hanel and Regina Riphahn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Barbara Broadway ()

No 9, Working Papers from Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)

Abstract: We use reforms in the Swiss public retirement system to identify the responsiveness of retirement timing to financial incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4 percent induces more than 70 percent of females to postpone their retirement. The responsiveness of male workers, who undergo a different treatment, is lower.

Keywords: retirement insurance; incentives; social security; labor force exit; natural experiment; Switzerland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2006-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bgpe.de/files/2024/05/009_Hanel_Riphahn.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: New Evidence on Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement (2009)
Working Paper: Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement: Evidence from Switzerland (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bav:wpaper:009_hanel_riphahn

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