Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement: Evidence from Switzerland

Barbara Hanel () and Regina Riphahn
Additional contact information
Barbara Hanel: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Barbara Broadway ()

No 2492, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We use reforms in the Swiss public retirement system to identify the responsiveness of retirement timing to financial incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4 percent induces more than 70 percent of females to postpone their retirement. The responsiveness of male workers, who undergo a different treatment, is lower.

Keywords: labor force exit; social security; incentives; retirement insurance; natural experiment; Switzerland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H55 J14 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-ias, nep-lab and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published - published as 'The Timing of Retirement - New Evidence from Swiss Female Workers' in: Labour Economics, 2012, 19(5), 718-728

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Working Paper: Financial Incentives and the Timing of Retirement: Evidence from Switzerland (2006)
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