The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: Evidence from a natural experiment
Marcus Drometer () and
Johannes Rincke ()
No 37, Working Papers from Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE)
Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is compli- cated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference esti- mations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifficant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.
Keywords: Ballot access; petition requirements; electoral competition; natural experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
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http://www.bgpe.de/texte/DP/037_drometer_rinke.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment (2009)
Working Paper: The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: Evidence from a natural experiment (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bav:wpaper:037_drometer_rinke
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