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The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: Evidence from a natural experiment

Marcus Drometer () and Johannes Rincke ()

Discussion Papers in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics

Abstract: Measuring the effect of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition is complicated because the stringency of ballot access regulations cannot be treated as being exogenous to candidates' entry decisions. This paper exploits the 1968 U.S. Supreme Court decision to strike down Ohio's ballot access laws as a natural experiment to overcome the endogeneity problem. The evidence from difference-in-difference estimations suggests that the court decision and the accompanying sharp decrease in Ohio's petition requirements resulted in major parties facing a signifcant increase in competition from third party and independent candidates.

Keywords: Ballot access; Petition requirements; Electoral competition; Natural experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2922/2/Ohio_Drometer_Rincke2008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: evidence from a natural experiment (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: The impact of ballot access restrictions on electoral competition: Evidence from a natural experiment (2008) Downloads
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