Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints
Tom Holden (),
Paul Levine () and
Jonathan Swarbrick ()
Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada
We present a model in which banks and other financial intermediaries face both occasionally binding borrowing constraints and costs of equity issuance. Near the steady state, these intermediaries can raise equity finance at no cost through retained earnings. However, even moderately large shocks cause their borrowing constraints to bind, leading to contractions in credit offered to firms, and requiring the intermediaries to raise further funds by paying the cost to issue equity. This leads to the occasional sharp increases in interest spreads and the countercyclical, positively skewed equity issuance that are characteristic of the credit crunches observed in the data.
Keywords: Business fluctuations and cycles; Credit and credit aggregates; Economic models; Financial markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 E32 E51 G2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-dge and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Credit Crunches from Occasionally Binding Bank Borrowing Constraints (2020)
Working Paper: Credit crunches from occasionally binding bank borrowing constraints (2018)
Working Paper: Credit crunches from occasionally binding bank borrowing constraints (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bca:bocawp:17-57
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Staff Working Papers from Bank of Canada 234 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G9, Canada. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().