Política Monetária e Supervisão do Sistema Financeiro Nacional no Banco Central do Brasil

Eduardo Lundberg ()

No 2, Working Papers Series from Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department

Abstract: This paper analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of maintaining the banking supervisory functions at the Banco Central do Brasil (BCB). First, these pros and cons are identified and listed using the economic literature, after a brief analysis of the ongoing debate and international experience regarding monetary policy, independence of the central bank and banking supervision. Then it is discussed the international tendencies as related to central bank reforms and the respective supervisory systems, including an annex panel of the experience of 40 different countries. The first and clearest tendency identified is to withdraw supervisory functions from the monetary authorities, normally seen as capable of strengthening the "central bank independence". The second trend - and one that seems to be gaining strength - is merger of the agencies charged with banking, securities and insurance supervision into a single agency, enhancing their capacity to perform the financial groups' consolidated supervision. There is no firm conclusion as the more effective institutional arrangement related to banking supervision under the control of the central bank or another institution.

Date: 2000-06
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bcb.gov.br/content/publicacoes/WorkingPaperSeries/wps02p.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bcb:wpaper:2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers Series from Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Rodrigo Barbone Gonzalez ().