Discretion and supplier selection in public procurement
Audinga Baltrunaite (),
Cristina Giorgiantonio (),
Sauro Mocetti () and
No 1178, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area
Public procurement outcomes depend on the ability of the procuring agency to select high-performing suppliers. Should public administrations be granted more or less discretion in their decision making? Using Italian data on municipal public works tendered in the period 2009-2013, we study how a reform extending the scope of bureaucrat discretion affects supplier selection. We find that the share of contracts awarded to firms having a local politician among its administrators or shareholders increases, while the (ex-ante) labor productivity of the winning firms decreases, thus suggesting a potential misallocation of public funds. These effects are concentrated among lower quality procurement agencies.
Keywords: discretion; supplier selection; public procurement; transparency; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H57 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-eur and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/temi-disc ... 178/en_tema_1178.pdf (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Discration and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1178_18
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) from Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().