Discration and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement
Cristina Giorgiantonio (),
Sauro Mocetti and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Audinga Baltrunaite
No 122, Working Papers from "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi
Public procurement outcomes depend on the ability of the procuring agency to select well-performing suppliers. Should public administrations be granted more or less discretion in their decision making? Using Italian data on municipal public works tendered in the period 2009-2013, we study how a reform extending the scope of bureaucrat discretion affects supplier selection. We find that the share of contracts awarded to politically connected firms increases while the (ex-ante) labor productivity of the winning firm decreases, thus suggesting a potential misallocation of the public funds. These effects are concentrated among lower quality procuring agencies.
Keywords: discretion; supplier selection; public procurement; transparency; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
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Journal Article: Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement (2021)
Working Paper: Discretion and supplier selection in public procurement (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:don:donwpa:122
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