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Individually Rational Colective Choice Under Random Preferences

Andrés Carvajal

Borradores de Economia from Banco de la Republica de Colombia

Abstract: In this paper I consider the following problem: There is a collection of, exogenously given, socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here characterize collective choices in terms of the way in wich individual preferences must co-vary in orden to explain them. I do this by combining standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random preferences.I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannon be rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be refuted.

Keywords: Revealed preference, random utility; collective choice; individual rationality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D70 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-dcm
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Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.32468/be.232 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Individually Rational Collective Choice Under Random Preferences (2003) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bdr:borrec:232

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