EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Individually-Rational Collective Choice under Random Preferences

Andrés Carvajal

No 04/29, Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London

Abstract: In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set. The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here characterize collective choices in terms of the way in which individual preferences must co-vary in order to explain them. I do this by combining standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random preferences. I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannot be rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be refuted.

Keywords: Revealed preference; random utility; collective choice; individual rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D70 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2004-11, Revised 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0429.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0429.pdf [307 Temporary Redirect]--> https://www.rhul.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0429.pdf [307 Temporary Redirect]--> https://www.royalholloway.ac.uk/economics/Research/WorkingPapers/pdf/dpe0429.pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Individually Rational Colective Choice Under Random Preferences (2003) Downloads
Working Paper: Individually Rational Collective Choice Under Random Preferences (2003) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hol:holodi:0429

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics from Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey, TW20 0EX, UK..
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Claire Blackman ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:hol:holodi:0429