Hiring and Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluations: A Laboratory Experiment

Andrej Angelovski, Jordi Brandts and Carles Sola
Additional contact information
Carles Sola: Department of Business Economics,Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

No 2014-02, BELIS Working Papers from BELIS, Istanbul Bilgi University

Abstract: In many organizations the measurement of job performance can not rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers’ and co-employees’ subjective evaluations of employees. Employees can either be hired by the manager, explicitly not hired by him and nevertheless assigned to him or exogenously assigned to him. We present data from three different treatments. For all three we find escalation bias both by managers and by co-employees. Managers exhibit a positive bias towards those employees they have hired or a negative one towards those they have explicitly not hired. Managers’ and employees’ biases are connected. Exogenously assigned employees are biased in favor of employees hired by the manager and against those explicitly not hired.

Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repeck.bilgi.org.tr/RePEc/beb/wpbels/BelisWP_BELIS02.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Hiring and escalation bias in subjective performance evaluations: A laboratory experiment (2016)
Working Paper: Hiring and Escalation Bias in Subjective Performance Evaluations: A Laboratory Experiment (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:beb:wpbels:201402

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in BELIS Working Papers from BELIS, Istanbul Bilgi University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fatih Mehmet Senyurt ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).