Efficient Priority Rules

Bettina Klaus () and Lars Ehlers

No 103, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Keywords: Indivisible objects; acyclic priority structures (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient priority rules (2006)
Working Paper: Efficient Priority Rules (2003)
Working Paper: Efficient Priority Rules (2003)
Working Paper: Efficient Priority Rules (2002)
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