Efficient Priority Rules

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Keywords: Acyclical priority structures; indivisible objects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficient Priority Rules (2015)
Journal Article: Efficient priority rules (2006)
Working Paper: Efficient Priority Rules (2003)
Working Paper: Efficient Priority Rules (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:11-2003

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